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Background
 Forward pricing in electricity markets is troublesome.
- Electricity non-storability implies that usual commodity pricing literature (and arbitrage/ cost of
carry arguments) may not hold.
 Electricity markets frequently present additional complications.
- Oligopoly, uniform-price auction and vertical integration.
 Theoretical literature discusses how forward contracts affect spot market
power. How does spot market power affect forward prices?
The hybrid pricing approach
 Several papers try to mimic electricity price’s stochastic behaviour in order
to value its derivatives.
- Focus on seasonality and spikes (short-lived and abrupt oscillations).
- Ex. Schwartz (1997), Schwartz and Smith (2000), Deng (2000), Lucia and Schwartz (2002) and
Cartea and Villaplana (2005).
 Alternative: hybrid pricing approach.
- Build on an equilibrium framework, explaining instantaneous price behaviour in terms of
observable state variables (demand and supply). Keep track of fundamentals.
- Assume state variables follow dynamic processes and apply no-arbitrage methodologies to
calculate derivatives.
Skantze, Gubina, and Ilic (2000), Barlow (2002), Pirrong and Jermakyan (2008), Cartea and
Villaplana (2008) and Lyle and Elliott (2009).
Equilibrium ground is too simple and based on a competitive spot market.
Some definitions
 There are N firms (K generators and R retailers). Firms can participate in
both markets (I=K+R-N gentailers).
 State variables:
 The consumers’ demand:
 Generator i’s cost function:
 Contracts:
Generators/gentailers’ auction problem
 The conditional cumulative function of market clearing price is:
 Generator/Gentailer i’s maximization problem:
 At any time, assume supply function is additively separable:
 Then, extending Hortaçsu & Puller (2008), we have the following supply 
schedule:
 Which is equivalent to:
Optimal supply schedule
elasticity of net residual demand
 If we further assume that there are K>2 generators/gentailers and that 
marginal costs and demand can be approximated by a linear function…
 …by the spot market clearing condition, we have:
Equilibrium spot price
 To isolate the impact of generators contracts on spot prices in the model:
- Assume we have an economy where K=N, which means all retailers participate of the generation
market.
- Assume also that only generators/gentailers transact in the forward market.
Forward pricing
Ex: New Zealand: Market shares in 2008
Source: Companies' annual reports 2008 and NZ Electricity Commission.
 There are two state variables: an inelastic demand and a cost shifter, say 
the water inflows. Interest rate is constant (forward=future).
 Under these assumptions the spot price equation simplifies to the following:
 Notice that in this case the generators’ quantity contracted does not affect 
spot prices. But the number of generators still does. Price is equal to 
average marginal cost.
Forward pricing II
 Assume that the demand oscillates around a deterministic function of time 
(seasonality). Cost shifter oscillates around a long term mean.
 Then, by Lucia & Schwartz (2002) two factor model, we have:
Forward pricing III
 .
 .
 .
Results
 Hybrid pricing models offer a promising framework to relate equilibrium
fundamentals to derivative pricing.
 Our model shows that, in a case where contracts are not significant in
influencing spot prices, the spot market power may still shift the whole
forward curve upwards.
 If market power affect forward prices it may affect the optimal quantity
contracted.
 Unlike the assumptions of most of the theoretical literature, forward
contracts are not exogenous. Its is important to fully understand its
determinants to evaluate its relationship with market power.
Conclusion
